Them's the brakes.

And in everything. As soon as the bundle theory was mentioned I became suspicious. Yet, there are two obvious responses to the main criticisms.

Bundling together a set of universal qualities does not entail the existence of a particular - for example, a set of qualities that define Pegasus (a horse, ability to fly etc) exists, but there is no object Pegasus. Seems clear enough to me that material existence could be a quality, which explains why Pegasus does not (and never did) exist, because like most of my jigsaws, the Pegasus set was missing one quality that would make it complete, in material form.

Second, Qualitative identity entails numerical identity - indiscernible objects are identical. In a similar way to the point expressed above, spatial location could be a quality. And maybe qualities should be given a new name to avoid confusion, like 'properties', just to escape any stigma attached to the word.

I suppose the main problem with universals is that they don't seem to be things that can be bundled together (no matter how much duct tape we use). Maybe it can only really be accepted by dualists who presuppose some interaction between the material and non-material realms.

Also, I've just realised I forgot to make the drawing funny. This may become a problem...